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Good things come in threes, so they say. In this paper Collins, Weinel and Evans (CWE) call for 
a ‘Third Wave’ of science studies where ‘scientific values should be central to society and that 
the advice of “those who know what they are talking about” should be given greater weight than 
those who do not’ (195). Their aim is to avoid the weakening of scientific authority they claim 
follows extending public participation in politics and science. 
 
As an academic working in the field of environment and development policy, I can empathize 
with CWE’s desire to ‘make policy in the face of growing uncertainty about scientific findings’ 
(185). But in the spirit of positive criticism, their arguments about how to manage expertise 
within politics simply won’t do. Rather than advancing science studies to a new, Third Wave, 
CWE want us to waive debates about participation to go back to old-fashioned trust in facts, 
experts and politics. 
 
In keeping with the theme of the paper, I shall advance three reasons why CWE’s ‘Third Wave’ 
might reduce political debate – and suggest three different ways to engage with expertise. 
 
Trust in facts. Much debate within science studies for years has highlighted the problematic 
relationship of facts and values. CWE start from this premise, writing ‘there is no clear fact-value 
distinction’ and that ‘technical experts cannot be expected to deliver the truth of the matter’ (188). 
Yet, the Third Wave argument seems to lose track with this tenet by protecting the role of experts 
to inform policymakers. Moreover, CWE state ‘we must know where the wisdom of ordinary folk 
stops as well as where it starts’ (196). 
 
This seems a curious transition. How can we admit that scientific fact gathering is influenced by 
values, yet still rely on scientific expertise to tell us who has legitimate knowledge? CWE explain 
this by saying ‘it is possible to distinguish between the unavoidable “intrinsic” politics of science 
and the “extrinsic” politics that are an explicit part of the political process’ (188). By this, they 
mean that science will always reflect values, but the use of expertise need not. I shall return to 
CWE’s proposed use of expertise under my third point. But my first criticism is that CWE seem 
to sidestep debates about how social participation can shape (or reshape) facts, and instead just 
want to emphasize that experts are people who can tell us what are facts. 
 
Experience has shown researchers that blindly trusting expert facts is a dangerous game. Much 
research in environmental science, for example, has indicated a variety of means in which 
‘received wisdom’ about environmental problems such as deforestation and desertification have 
undergone changes according to how experts have changed their minds. Widening participation 
has been a crucial part of these changes. Participation can enhance how we understand 
environmental processes. But perhaps more importantly, it helps reframe empirical research to 
develop explanations and solutions to problems as locally experienced.  
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The problem is that CWE underpoliticize the production of facts. Participation sometimes makes 
facts more relevant, useful and accurate. Fighting participation might reify old facts based on old 
framings. 
 
Trust in experts: The second problem is that the Third Wave places remarkable trust in the 
intentions, integrity and neutrality of experts. CWE write: ‘the only demand under the Third 
Wave is that scientists and technologists should try to insulate their work from the political and 
cultural environment’ (188).  
 
These are noble ideals. Are they achievable? I am not suggesting we should stereotype experts 
and scientists as unethical (although perhaps there are examples). Rather, academic debates have 
argued for some time that expertise frequently forms parts of wider systems of governance and 
control, and that individual agency frequently cannot change that. Moreover, ‘science’ does not 
simply generate knowledge in instantly trusted ways: it requires validation, recognition and 
placements within paradigms of normality and recognized institutions. Does simply asking 
experts to act cognitively to ‘insulate their work from the political and cultural environment’ 
achieve neutrality? 
 
My view is not. There is also a long-standing debate about the problems of achieving neutrality of 
expert knowledge that CWE don’t refer to. For example, are epistemic communities (or scientific 
networks) separate from normative values? Discussions of governmentality in international 
development have argued that expertise (or at least officially sanctioned expertise) has reflected 
and enforced colonial or neo-liberal systems of control. Defining ‘expertise’ excludes public 
debate. Certainly, CWE voice a well-known frustration that linking expertise to politics might be 
too disabling for decision making. But my question is whether this dilemma can be fixed by 
urging experts to insulate themselves from their political environment as though this is possible or 
indeed likely? 
 
CWE add a further point. They say: ‘under elective modernism the use of quasi-religious/populist 
symbolic arguments can make no contribution’ (190) (where elective modernism is the choice to 
use expertise rationally). The problem here is in deciding what is quasi-religious or symbolic. 
Again, in environmental literature, much deep-green environmental writing has an overtly 
spiritual element, and sometimes appeals to a vision of ‘nature’ that supports humanity. These 
writings carry great sway in various environmental debates. It is probably more important to ask 
why, and for whose interests, certain knowledge is authoritative, – and how far using descriptions 
such as ‘quasi-religious’ are deemed acceptable or not. But CWE refer to ‘quasi-religious’ 
sentiments as though these are easy to see and universally defined – which is optimistic at least. 
 
Trust in politics: The third challenge is that CWE wish us to trust public debate and policy 
processes to separate ‘technical’ aspects of expertise from its ‘political’ use. CWE write: ‘under 
elective modernism what matters is not that “science,” or scientific practice or scientific 
knowledge is chosen as the central element of our culture but that “scientific values” are seen as 
being part of a democratic society’ (189). 
 
There are specters of Popper’s Open Society here, or Habermasian principles of ideal speech 
within accessible public spheres. Indeed, CWE write: ‘democracy, like Habermas’ (1972) vision 
of science, aspires to the ideal speech situation irrespective of whether it can be achieved’ (192). 
 
Those last words are important: ‘whether it can be achieved.’ What if it isn’t achieved? What if 
the current public arenas of expertise and discussion about important policy issues are more 
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commonly not this ideal situation but instead manipulated and opaque? If this latter situation is 
more accurate, does it help to keep trusting in an ideal outcome? CWE apparently believe so. But 
many other researchers have long since left searching for the Holy Grail and instead have spent 
time analyzing ‘speech’ as it actually exists. Indeed, believing in ideal speech as a background to 
politics might even reduce the political analysis of how speech is controlled or manipulated. 
Expertise can form part of this de-politicization if it implies some themes are not to be discussed. 
Extending public participation in politics is partly to empower people to challenge this kind of 
expertise.  
 
Rethinking the Third Wave. The Third Wave argument seeks to clarify decision making by 
proposing ways to avoid alleged technological populism brought by wider participation. Yet, the 
price of the Third Wave is to place trust in facts as they stand (rather than reshaping facts through 
participation); put trust in the cognitive depoliticization of experts (rather than address the non-
cognitive processes); and trusting political debate and rationality to separate the technical aspects 
of expertise from political manipulations.  I believe these proposals overlook the epistemological 
links of social participation and knowledge. They neglect the contested role of experts as de facto 
agents of social progress. They simplify how political debate really occurs.  
 
But rather than leaving it there, I propose three themes implicit in the Third Wave need further 
attention. To be clear, CWE’s ambitions to inform policymaking in the face of uncertainty are 
worthy. The question is how to get there. 
 
Combine Expertise with Truth Claims. There is a curious lack of attention to philosophy of 
science in the Third Wave. CWE acknowledge that ‘intrinsic politics cannot be avoided’ (188) 
meaning that there is no clear fact-value distinction – and they acknowledge that ‘technical 
experts cannot be expected to deliver the truth of the matter, especially in the short term’ (188). 
But they then propose it should be clear that experts are ‘those who know what they are talking 
about’ (195). 
 
As discussed above, these statements seem contradictory. But more generally, they refer 
implicitly to debates within philosophy of science about the nature and validation of truth claims. 
CWE shy away from discussing these. Similarly, CWE discuss ‘technological populism’ but 
never once say ‘relativism.’ Again, philosophy of science is avoided. 
 
It seems the cause of this mismatch is because CWE refer to science as a culture rather than a 
method. In their words, ‘science is a distinct “form-of-life” distinguished by the key “formative 
intentions” of the actors’ (187).  Expertise is also defined in terms of experience: ‘expertise is real 
and turns on possession of tacit knowledge gained through participation in social communities’ 
(188). The problem of these statements is that they perceive expertise and science to be questions 
of chosen behavior, rather than an engagement with truth claims and proposed explanations. 
 
But science is not simply passive: it is also a means of gathering information and searching for 
explanations. Science and experts can use their work to reshape understandings of the world. 
CWE state ‘The Third Wave argues that the political phase should always have priority’ (188), 
by which they mean that technical knowledge and post-hoc political discussion can be separated. 
This is a very end-of-pipe approach to scientific knowledge and political debate. 
 
Instead, there is a different approach that sees scientific research itself as guided by political 
discussion preceding empirical research. Steve Fuller (2000) – for one – calls this a ‘politically-
oriented social epistemology.’ In international development, this research has been most 
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illustrated by using participation of local actors to frame research, rather than pose as an 
alternative and equal form of expertise. 
 
There is a need to question how far debates about ‘expertise’ also need to overlap with 
epistemological questions about the generation of facts. CWE’s Third Wave, however, does not 
engage at all with science as a method, or how social participation can reshape facts. 
 
Avoid Narrow Definitions of Expertise. CWE’s periodic table of expertises is an interesting 
approach to defining socially located domains of tacit knowledge. Yet, it is also somewhat rigid 
and stereotypical. The biggest problem is that empowering ‘those who know what they are 
talking about’ also implies a political decision to silence voices. Whose say is this? 
 
CWE themselves know there are tensions in this position. They write: ‘the Third Wave may have 
been treated as heretical in the heartlands of science and technology studies’ (196). But they also 
say ‘the Third Wave paper has developed into a new approach to the social nature of science 
together with full scale program of research’ (186). Something is awry here. 
 
Similarly, CWE equate ‘technological populism’ with ‘participation’ in ways that seem 
stereotypical and unfair. It is easy to poke holes at extremely relativist research that reduces truth 
claims to social solidarities alone, or which claims local citizens are as much an expert as trained 
professionals. But are these positions urban myths? I know no analyst who reduces expert claims 
to an infinite level of relativism. Rather, there are numerous crucial questions that might relate to 
some level of relativism; or the role of ‘symmetry’ in scientific explanation; and the extent to 
which increasing social participation undermines visions of scientific certainty. None of these 
debates simply equate one person’s knowledge with another’s. Indeed, this kind of analysis can 
assist the governance of expertise in ways that the Third Wave cannot. 
 
There is still much work to be done to disentangle the word ‘expertise’ to indicate what really lies 
beneath. Truth claims and expertise is one theme. But more generally, researchers need to clarify 
whether ‘expertise’ means talking on behalf of other people; talking for oneself; or engaging with 
dialogue to reach more useful and appropriate outcomes. In the field of environment and 
development, many ‘scientific’ mistakes have occurred when experts apply explanations and 
solutions out of context to physical conditions or social behaviors. Different forms of research 
based on wider participation have been successful in making expert recommendations more 
useful.  
 
Expertise is More Than Technocracy. CWE frame their debate in somewhat old-fashioned terms. 
The key concern, they say, is ‘the solution to the problem of technocracy and scientism’ (186). 
They then go on to cite Habermas in terms of the ideal speech they would like to see. Indeed, 
their own proposed solution is that ‘good societies have scientific values at their heart because 
scientific values are democratic values’ (193). 
 
It is not surprising, then, that CWE’s treatment of expertise is couched in terms of how it is used 
rather than how it is produced. The key concern is scientism as a form of political oppression 
arising from scientific technocracy. But putting trust in democracy and scientific values will not 
reduce the barriers to public participation. Nor will it help us govern the role of expert knowledge 
in certain examples of political control. In other words, the debate has moved on from the worries 
about technocracy voiced by Habermas.  
 
As a way to illustrate this point, I shall end with a very abridged example concerning climate 
change policy. Climate change is clearly a concern of immense importance yet also scientific 
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uncertainty. Implementing climate change policy requires numerous applications of trust in 
scientific assessments, or in philosophies of risk such as the precautionary principle. It also spans 
diverse actors from climate modelers to citizens driving cars, and farmers in poorer countries. 
Few (if any?) people argue that these different actors have equal and equivalent expert 
knowledge. 
 
Yet the role of expertise is both contested and highly changing. The main epistemic community 
of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) has changed in its composition from 
largely meteorologists in 1990 to a variety of physical and social scientists in the 2000s. Despite 
this, its authority is also challenged repeatedly. Climate change policy has also changed focus 
from – almost entirely – reducing greenhouse gas concentrations (or mitigation) (under the Kyoto 
Protocol) to a variety of actions aimed at mitigation, capacity building, and adaptation to climate 
change (under the Copenhagen and Cancun agreements). Moreover, approaches to so-called 
climate change adaptation is changing from physical interventions (such as building sea walls) to 
more developmental strategies that might reduce climate risks by increasing local resilience or 
livelihood options. ‘Adaptation’ here might include ‘community-based adaptation,’ which is a 
way of addressing international development assistance for those risks largely defined by 
vulnerable people. 
 
Expertise and expert networks have therefore changed over time. The older notions of seeing 
climate change policy as mitigation alone are being replaced because of a more complex view of 
what climate change risks pose. No one suggests local people in poorer countries can produce 
information similar to the climate change modelers. But an increasing number of experts are 
consulting, and indeed allowing vulnerable people to frame policies aiming to reduce risks. 
 
This is a current example of science and technology decision making in action. It is hard to see 
the Third Wave operating on this example. The nature of ‘facts’ relating to climate change risk 
have changed over time, and with different levels of participation. Climate change deniers and 
cassandras have portrayed themselves as authoritative using various tactics and claims that are 
very different from the cognitively dispassionate engagement CWE call for. The resulting 
political debate is still opaque to many participants and open to manipulation and 
misrepresentation. It is hard to see the Third Wave operating here now or idealistically in the 
future. Indeed, reducing public participation in climate change policy would more likely 
undermine the applicability of climate change science, and weaken public support for policies. 
 
Instead of the Third Wave, science studies should continue what it does, but try to do it better. 
Labeling expertise in terms of ‘who knows what they are talking about’ is well intentioned but 
almost culpably clumsy in terms of what this means for authoritative knowledge, political control, 
and public debate. Expertise is fluid in content, membership, and in terms of public legitimacy. 
Making the content, membership and legitimacy of expertise more transparent – rather than in 
trusting in current classifications – is the way ahead. 
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